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Over the last five years, the nature of the relationship between Con-
gress and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has changed dramatically.
Although the relationship remains one of interdependence, in which
Congress depends on the IRS to execute the Internal Revenue Code
and collect the revenues necessary to fund the federal government and
the IRS depends on Congress to fund and authorize its operations, two
marked changes have occurred.
First, congressional review of tax administration by the IRS has be-
come intense and frequent.' Congress's relationship with the IRS be-
gan in 1862 with the creation of the Office of Internal Revenue in the
Treasury Department.2 For more than a century thereafter-until
1975-congressional involvement in IRS affairs was limited largely to
the annual review and debate of the agency's budget, and consultation
with the commissioner about proposed changes in the tax law.3 To be
sure, Congress would at times review the administration of the tax law
to uncover corruption,4 assess efficiency,5 examine enforcement meth-
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suggestions. This Article is a revised version of a study published by the Fund for Public
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should not be attributed to any member of the Ways and Means Committee, to its staff,
or to the Fund for Public Policy Research.
1. See pp. 1369-70 infra.
2. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. CXIX, § 1, 12 Stat. 432 (1862) (I.R.C. § 7802(a)). For a
discussion of tax administration prior to 1862, see L. SCHMECKEBIER 9- F. EBLE, THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE 2-6 (1923); R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4-7
(1954).
3. See, e.g., Proposed Revenue Act of 1918: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1918) (statement of Commissioner Roper).
4. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 83D CONG., 1ST SESS., INTERNAL REVENUE INVESTIGATION:
REPORT TO THE COMMa. ON WAYS AND MEANS 1 (Comm. Print 1953) (investigation of cor-
ruption and incompetence at all levels of revenue administration); Statement of Informa-
tion, Book VIII: Internal Revenue Service Hearings Pursuant to H. Res. 803 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (investigation of allegations that
Nixon White House sought to use IRS for political purposes).
5. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, INVESTIGATION OF THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE: REPORT BY THE ADVISORY GROUP APPOINTED PURSUANT TO
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ods,6 or weigh the Service's handling of particular types of cases7 or
parts of the tax law.8 For the most part, however, such involvement was
only occasional and sporadic. This is no longer the case.9
Second, Congress has shown a recent tendency to use a variety of
techniques to prohibit the IRS from executing certain aspects of the
Code, rather than changing the Code itself.10 These techniques involve
legislative prohibitions that forbid the IRS to provide nationwide
guidance with respect to certain tax issues, and appropriations limita-
tions that restrict the Service's use of operating funds to administer
various provisions of the Code.
These congressional prohibitions raise a variety of constitutional and
practical issues. Some arguably violate the doctrine of separation of
powers, and others may unconstitutionally affect similarly situated tax-
payers unequally. From a purely practical standpoint, these prohibitions
severely impair the efficient administration of the tax laws and may
encourage a public perception that the tax system is unfair, thereby
adversely affecting voluntary compliance with the law." This Article
establishes that these congressional prohibitions are imprudent from a
tax policy perspective, and reviews the constitutional problems they
may raise. Part I describes the roles of Congress and the IRS in the
formulation and implementation of the tax law. Part II analyzes the
constitutional and administrative problems that have been caused by
PUBLic LAw, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1948) (structural organization of Bureau caused
duplication of efforts); H.R. REP. No. 2518, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952) (evidence of im-
proper administration of individual taxpayer returns).
6. See, e.g., Invasions of Privacy (Government Agencies): Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1119 (1965) (IRS wiretapping activities); Equal Educational Opportunity:
Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity (part 3D),
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (examining enforcement of tax law to deny racially discrimina-
tory private schools benefit of tax-exempt status).
7. See, e.g., Travel and Entertainment Expenditures: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963) (status of regulations under I.R.C. § 274
concerning deductibility of travel and entertainment expenses); Equal Educational Op-
portunity: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity
(part 3D), supra note 6, at 1965 (administration of tax law with respect to racially dis-
criminatory private schools).
8. See, e.g., Investigation of Conglomerate Corporations: Hearings Before the Antitrust
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (administra-
tion of corporate reorganization provisions); Section 722 of the Internal Revenue Code:
Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946) (administration of provision for statutory relief from excess profits tax).
9. See pp. 1369-70 infra.
10. See pp. 1370-75 infra.
11. For a discussion of voluntary compliance and self-assessment, see R. BLAKEY & G.
BLAKEY, TnE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 567-69 (1940); THE AMERICAN WAY IN TAXATION:
INTERNAL REVENUE, 1862-1963, at 1-2 (L. Doris ed. 1963).
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the recent shift in Congress's role, and Part III suggests changes that
could improve the relationship between Congress and the IRS.
I. Parameters of the Relationship Between Congress and the IRS
The relationship between Congress and the IRS, like all interaction
between the legislative and executive branches of the federal govern-
ment, is governed by the powers and restrictions of the Constitution.
The separation of powers doctrine, implied from the language of the
Constitution, 12 seemingly lodges legislative power in the Congress,"
executive power in the President,' 4 and judicial power in the courts.1 5
It is thus the formal responsibility of Congress to enact revenue laws,'0
and the duty of the IRS as part of the executive branch to ensure that
those laws are "faithfully executed."' 7 There ends the high school civics
lesson, however, for such a formalistic conception hardly reflects the
true nature of the interaction between Congress and the executive
branch. The Constitution does not create separate institutions with
separate powers, but separated institutions with shared powers.' 8 That
reality affects the roles of and interplay between Congress and the IRS
with respect to tax administration.
A. IRS Duty to Execute the Laws Faithfully
When the IRS executes the Code, it also makes tax law. Because the
execution of any law necessarily requires interpreting it, "lawmaking"
12. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 2 (1978). The division of
governmental powers among coequal branches was considered the best way to ensure
personal freedom. See THE FEDERALISt Nos. 47 and 51; Sharp, The Classical American
Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 385 (1935).
13. U.S. CONsT. art. I. See generally Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem
of Presidential Legislation, 40 LAw SL CoNTEMP. PROB. I (Summer 1976).
14. U.S. CONST. art. II. See generally Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contem-
porary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323
(1977); Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three
Doctrines, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 46 (Summer 1976).
15. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
17. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3 (President shall take care that laws be faithfully executed).
18. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 28-29 (1965) (doc-
trine of separation of powers is expression of "a general attitude rather then [sic] in-
exorable table of organization"); Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM.
L. REv. 371, 386 (1976) (lack of arbitrary lines of separation). It is now widely recognized
that each of the three branches performs activities that are primarily within the realm
of the other two. See, e.g., Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209-10 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (the "great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white," and must be interpreted "with a certain latitude or our
government could not go on."); L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 16.
1362
Vol. 89: 1360, 1980
IRS Enforcement
is inevitably a part of the faithful execution of the law.19 Whenever
an IRS revenue agent audits a taxpayer's tax return to determine
whether additional tax is due, the IRS makes law with respect to that
taxpayer. It does so by interpreting the tax law and applying that in-
terpretation to the set of facts represented by the particular taxpayer's
return.20 As Karl Llewellyn observed, what "officials do about disputes
is ... the law itself."21
The IRS also makes law institutionally, as well as through its in-
dividual agents. Nationwide guidance is mandatory if the approximate-
ly 85,000 Civil Service employees 22 of the IRS are to execute the tax law
in a uniform manner. Similarly, the IRS must inform taxpayers and
tax practitioners of its various interpretations of the tax law. This
nationwide guidance and information may be provided in many forms,
including revenue rulings and procedures, 23 acquiescences and non-
acquiescences in Tax Court decisions, 24 public written determina-
19. See, e.g., Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 CoLUM. L. REv.
359, 360 (1947) ("every statute is a delegation of lawmaking power to the agency ap-
pointed to enforce it"); cf. B. BITrrER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF COR-
rORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14.01, at 14-7 to 14-8 (4th ed. 1979) (IRS can sometimes
make "law" by "a lifted eyebrow"; practitioners must study statute, regulations, decisions,
published rulings, and "the informal administrative climate").
20. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 19, at 360 (power to declare law applicable to particular
case is the power to apply general formula to specific situation); S. Con. Res. 21: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 215 (1951) (statement of Chief Judge Learned Hand) (administrative agencies cannot
simply "carry out their duties" because rules are never so clear as to obviate necessity of
interpretation). The Statement of Principles of Internal Tax Administration, published as
a preface to every Internal Revenue Bulletin, states that "[a]t the heart of administration
is interpretation of the code." See, e.g., 1979-1 C.B. ii.
21. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (2d ed. 1951).
22. [1978] INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ANN. REP. 5.
23. See Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43
TAXES 756, 763-66 (1965) (stressing informative effect of revenue rulings). Revenue rulings
set forth the Service's opinion of the tax law with respect to a stated set of facts, and
usually originate with a written request from a taxpayer for information concerning the
application of tax law or rulings about a matter of general interest. Revenue procedures
set forth certain practices and procedures that affect "the rights or duties of taxpayers"
or that "should be a matter of public knowledge." See Rev. Proc. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 693.
Revenue procedures are published weekly in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, and are
consolidated in the semiannual Cumulative Bulletin. See generally L. REDMAN S- J.
QUIGGLE, PROCEDURE BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 42-44 (5th ed. 1974). Revenue
rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations. See Stubbs, Overbeck & Assocs.,
Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1971) (revenue ruling "is merely the
opinion of a lawyer in the agency and must be accepted as such. It may be helpful in
interpreting a statute, but it is not binding on the Secretary or the courts.")
24. Acquiescence or nonacquiescence in a particular Tax Court decision indicates the
agreemeht or disagreement of the Service with respect to an adverse decision. These notices
are also published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
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tions,2 5 the Internal Revenue Manual, 26 the IRS Statement of Pro-
cedural RulesY and information releases.2 s The IRS does not possess
the legislative power to alter statutes, but it must interpret the laws in
order to enforce them.2 9 The constitutional duty to execute the laws
faithfully makes it unavoidable that agencies will make as well as
enforce the law.
Moreover, Congress has expressly delegated legislative power to the
IRS30 to make "regulations for the enforcement of this title."3' In
some instances, Congress has specifically instructed the IRS to promul-
gate regulations in order to carry out the general policies expressed in
specific underlying statutory provisions.32 Any regulation contrary to
25. The term, "written determination," is defined at Section 6110(b) of the Code to
mean any ruling, determination letter, or technical advice memorandum. With the enact-
ment of Section 1201 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520
(1976) (codified at I.R.C. § 6110), "written determinations" are now public. Prior to the
1976 Tax Reform Act, private letter rulings were not publicly disclosed. Although written
determinations are not published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, they are summarized
on a weekly basis in a private publication, Tax Notes, and published by Commerce Clear-
ing House (CCH). Written determinations are also available from the Service.
26. The Internal Revenue Manual is a compilation of instructions promulgated by the
Service for the guidance of its employees in administering the tax law. See Parnell, The
Internal Revenue Manual: Its Utility and Legal Effect, 32 TAx LAw. 687 (1979) (explana-
tion of structure and contents of Manual, and analysis of what legal effect courts should
give it).
27. See 26 C.F.R. Part 601 (1979) (setting forth Service's Statement of Procedural Rules).
28. See L. REDMAN 9- J. QuIGcGL, supra note 23, at 51.
29. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) ("The power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly,
by Congress."). The Supreme Court has often noted that administrative agencies may not
usurp Congress's legislative prerogative, of course. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 213 (1976) (rulemaking power granted administrative agency is not power to
make law, but to carry out will of Congress); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner,
297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (power to prescribe rules and regulations in order to administer
federal statute "is not the power to make law").
30. The legislative power to promulgate regulations is delegated to the Secretary of
the Department of the Treasury and not directly to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
but the responsibility to draft initial regulations falls to the IRS. See L. REDMAN & J.
QUIGGLE, supra note 23, at 41.
31. I.R.C. § 7805(a).
32. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 385, 1502. Despite a confused and uneasy doctrinal development,
the Supreme Court has upheld the delegation of legislative power under a multitude of
theories. See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (statute delegated merely
executive functions); The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 383, 388 (1813) (upholding
delegation under theory that statute can operate conditionally). In Boske v. Comingore,
177 U.S. 459 (1900), the Supreme Court approved a delegation by Congress that authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations for the guidance of his depart-
ment, which included the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Id. at 468-69. IRS regulations
promulgated by virtue of specific congressional instructions have been held to be a proper
delegation of power to the Commissioner when Congress determined that it would have
been impractical to prescribe the detailed rules necessary to complete the statutory frame-
work. See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967); S. Slater & Sons, Inc. v.
White, 119 F.2d 839, 845 (1st Cir. 1941).
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the underlying statute promulgated by the IRS is invalid, of course.33
The power to alter or change the underlying statute belongs exclu-
sively to Congress, and the IRS seeks to ensure that it will not act
beyond the scope of its delegated authority by adopting a policy of
self-restraint when interpreting the Code.34 Further, Congress possesses
the power to investigate the IRS administration of the tax law and may
change the underlying statute when it disagrees with a particular IRS
interpretation. 35 Moreover, courts restrain the IRS by reviewing many
of its pronouncements and ranking the weight to be given to various
forms of IRS interpretations." The recognition that there are limits to
the IRS's lawmaking power, however, also acknowledges the constitu-
tionality of that power.
B. Congressional Oversight
Just as the duty of the IRS to enforce the law involves lawmaking,
congressional lawmaking has certain obvious features of law enforce-
ment. Although there are important limits on Congress's enforcement
authority,37 it has long been acknowledged that the power of Congress
33. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 24 (1969); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co.
v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
34. See, e.g., Statement of Principles of Internal Revenue Tax Administration, 1979-1
C.B. ii (responsibility of IRS agent "charged with the duty of interpreting the law [is]
to try to find the true meaning of the statutory provision and not to adopt a strained
construction in the belief that he is 'protecting the revenue' "; administration should be
reasonable within the bounds of law).
35. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 352, 92 Stat. 2846 (uncodified)
(invalidating Rev. Rul. 76-242, 1976-1 C.B. 132, which ruled that taxpayer engaged in
farming who used accrual method of accounting must inventory growing crops).
36. See, e.g., Parnell, supra note 26; Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regula-
tions Under the Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 556 (1940).
Legislative regulations issued pursuant to specific congressional delegations of authority
are given great deference. See, e.g., United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973); FCC
v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965). Such regulations will be overturned only when patently
unrealistic or contrary to the underlying statute. Revenue rulings, on the other hand, are
considered useful but not binding in construing the tax law. See, e.g., Stubbs, Overbeck &
Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1971). In determining whether
the IRS has exceeded its powers, courts have also considered whether the IRS pronounce-
ment was contemporaneous or followed shortly after the enactment of the underlying
statute, see, e.g., Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969) (contemporaneous regula-
tions must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with statute), and
whether the IRS interpretation is long standing or predates the reenactment of the
underlying statute.
37. See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955) (congressional power to
investigate does not extend to private affairs unrelated to valid legislative purpose, areas
in which Congress is forbidden to legislate, or beyond individual protections of the Bill
of Rights); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1957) (Congress must delineate
scope of committee's investigatory authority, and witnesses may challenge relevance of
particular questions to subject matter of investigation). Although Congress has the power
to subpoena witnesses and documents, see House Rule XI cl. I(m), H.R. Doc. No. 403,
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to investigate is an inherent and indispensable part of its legislative
power.38
A host of committees and subcommittees currently are charged with
assessing the execution of the Code by the IRS. In the House, both the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the Ways and Means Committee39 and
the Government Operations Committee4 0 are empowered to investigate
and oversee IRS execution of the Code. In the Senate, the Govern-
mental Affairs Committee 4t and the Subcommittee on Oversight of the
Internal Revenue Service of the Senate Finance Committee 42 share this
responsibility. In addition, the Joint Committee on Taxation 43 may
"investigate the administration of ... taxes by the Internal Revenue
Service or any executive department, establishment, or agency charged
with their administration." 44 The appropriations committees of the
House45 and Senate 40 also scrutinize agency affairs and can affect IRS
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 411 (1979) (House committees); Section 134(a) of the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 190(a) (1976)) (Senate committees); I.R.C.
§ 8021(b)(2) (Joint Committee on Taxation), some claims of executive privilege are con-
stitutionally based. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-08 (1974); cf. United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953) (department heads may also claim privilege of
withholding information from Congress). See generally Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 1383, 1386 (1974).
38. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, Il (1959); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 195 (1957). In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927), the
Court held that "the power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function." See generally J. HAMILTON, THE POWER
TO PROBE: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (1976); Berger, Congressional Sub-
poenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 865 (1975).
39. See Rule 4 c. 6, Manual of Rules of the Committee on Ways and Means for the
96th Congress, reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. H541-43 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979) (Subcommittee
on Oversight has jurisdiction to evaluate administration of tax law).
40. House Rule X cl. 4(c)(2), H.R. Doc. No. 403, supra note 37, at 373 (jurisdiction
to conduct investigations of any matter at any time without regard to other committee
jurisdictions). House Rule X cl. 2(c), id. at 366, requires coordination between the Gov-
ernment Operations Committee and other House committees, but it is questionable
whether coordination concerning IRS oversight activities is even partially effectuated.
See generally J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 275 (1964) (need for
more effective control of investigations to assure that inquiries are fairly and efficiently
controlled).
41. Senate Rule XXV cl. l(k)(2)(B), S. Doc. No. 1, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 35 (1977)
(jurisdiction to study "the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and de-
partments of the Government").
42. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] CONGRESSIONAL INDEX (CCH) § 12,059.
43. See I.R.C. §§ 8001-8023.
44. id. § 8022(1)(B).
45. See House Rule X cl. 1(b), H.R. Doc. No. 403, supra note 37, at 366 (jurisdiction
of House Appropriations Committee); House Rule X cl. 2(b)(3), id. (committee may "con-
duct such studies and examinations of the organization and operation of executive
agencies ... as it may deem necessary").
46. See Senate Rule XXV cl. 1(b), S. Doc. No. 1, supra note 41, at 27 (jurisdiction of
Senate Appropriations Committee). Section 134(a) of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 190b (1976)),




activities through their control of the purse.47
Some of these subcommittees have displayed avid interest in IRS
activities relating to particular taxpayers. For example, six investigative
hearings were held during the Ninety-fifth Congress alone concerning
the tax-exempt status of the Central States Teamsters Fund.48 The
Supreme Court has held that congressional investigative power encom-
passes cases pending before administrative agencies; 49 although hearings
that concern a pending case should not be allowed to affect the ultimate
administrative action improperly, it is the IRS that must guard against
being improperly influenced by committee hearings 0 or statements of
individual congressmen.51
Congress also reviews the IRS's institutional interpretations of the
tax law. Recently, for example, various congressional committees have
held hearings concerning proposed regulations relating to the foreign
tax credit. 2 Such hearings often require that administration officials
justify their interpretations against criticism, sometimes voiced in an
47. The network of congressional committees overseeing the IRS is buttressed by the
General Accounting Office, which analyzes various facets of tax administration for the
oversight committees and the Joint Committee on Taxation. Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, §§ 231-236, 84 Stat. 1140 (1970) (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 1171-1176 (1976)).
48. See, e.g., Central States Teamsters Fund: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1978); Inquiry Into
Activities and Status of the Department of Labor Task Force on Teamsters Pension Fund:
Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
49. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200-01 (1957) (investigative power
includes inquiries concerning administration of existing laws). But see I.R.C. § 6103(f)
(committees must sit in closed executive session when dealing with tax return information
unless the taxpayer consents in writing to public session).
50. In Koniag, Inc. v. Kleppe, 405 F. Supp. 1360 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Koniag,
Inc. v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the district court determined that certain
congressional hearings "constituted an impermissible congressional interference with the
administrative process." 405 F. Supp. at 1372. The court of appeals reversed, however, after
finding error on "the standing and congressional interference issues." 580 F.2d at 604.
But see p. 1378 infra (discussing improper congressional influence on administrative
process).
51. See p. 1378 infra; SUBCOMM. OF THE CONINI. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
82D CONG., 1sT SEss., REPORT ON ETHICAL STANDARDS IN GOVERNMENT 29-30 (Comm. Print
1951) (some Members may try to pressure administrators on behalf of constituents; con-
gressmen must "make sure that the methods of intervening in administrative affairs are
not themselves so inherently damaging to the administrative process . . . that they
offset any public benefit that might be gained from any such legislative pressure.")
52. See, e.g., Foreign Tax Credit for Oil and Gas Extraction Taxes: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); Foreign Tax Credit
for Multinational Oil Corporations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic
Policy of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Foreign
Tax Credits: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Af-
fairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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aggressive and hostile manner.53 Similarly, individual members of Con-
gress "are constantly in touch with the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment and with administrative agencies-they may cajole, and exhort
with respect to the administration of a federal statute. '5 4 Although
several courts have held particular congressional influences on execu-
tive agencies to be improper,-5 most of these actions seem well within
the constitutional authority of congressional committees and individual
congressmen.5 6
The power of Congress to investigate the IRS is wide-ranging and
may effectively be limited only by discretion and prudence.57 Congress's
oversight entities possess an almost unwieldy power to inquire into,
prod, and make suggestions to the Service. Nonetheless, although the
IRS ultimately must be accountable to Congress, 8 whose members are
in turn accountable to the people, the IRS also has a constitutional duty
to execute the tax law faithfully by determining and administering it
properly. The IRS must give congressional comments only as much
deference as they deserve on the merits, for the agency has no duty to
placate particular congressmen or committees. Given the fine line be-
tween lawmaking and law enforcement, it is always difficult to say
when one shades into the other, but clearly there is an inevitable
tension between congressional oversight powers and the executive
exercise of delegated powers to interpret, articulate, and execute the
tax laws. Moreover, recent developments threaten to exacerbate rather
than ease that tension.
II. Unwarranted Curtailment of IRS Power
Prior to 1975, the vast majority of congressional encounters with the
IRS concerned annual budget review and proposed tax law changes.
53. See, e.g., Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 879-88 (1979)
(colloquy betwen Congressman Crane and Commissioner Kurtz).
54. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
55. E.g., D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972) (individual congressman improperly influenced agency
decision); Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966) (congressional committee in-
quiry violated due process rights of administrative litigants).
56. Several courts have refused to find congressional influences improper. E.g., American
Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978)
(committee action did not improperly affect agency action); Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563
F.2d 588 (3rd Cir. 1977) (committee inquiry did not impermissibly interfere with agency
proceeding); United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (in-
dividual congressman did not impermissibly influence agency action).
57. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) ("Self-discipline and the voters
must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses" of congressional
investigations).
58. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. PRav.
1669, 1675 (1975).
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Congressional review of tax law administration was the exception, not
the rule, and such review focused entirely on problems of efficiency
and corruption. Since 1975, however, there has been an explosion in
the number of congressional hearings that review IRS administration
of the tax law, coupled with an increasing tendency of Congress to
prohibit the IRS from executing certain aspects of the tax law. Some
legislative prohibitions effectively stop the administration of the tax
law in accord with certain revenue rulings or proposed regulations, and
other prohibitions result in the temporary substitution of prior IRS
rules.
This shift in emphasis raises a number of constitutional and practical
questions that to date have largely been ignored. Do certain congres-
sional enactments violate the separation of powers doctrine or create
nonuniformity in the administration of the tax laws that violates the
equal protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment? At what point
do legislative enactments so impair rational tax administration that they
warrant criticism on practical grounds? These questions must be ad-
dressed.
A. Changes in Congressional Review of the IRS
A few examples will illustrate the increasing tendency of Congress to
review the tax administration of the IRS. Both the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee established over-
sight subcommittees in January 1975." During the next five years,
through December 1979, the IRS Commissioner or his representative
made 134 appearances before these and other congressional commit-
tees;60 of these appearances, 104 involved congressional oversight of tax
administration."' During the Ninety-fourth Congress, the subjects of
these hearings ranged from IRS intelligence operations62 and adminis-
tration of the tax law with respect to professional sports franchises
63
59. See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 701, 88 Stat. 295, 325
(1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 190d(a) (1976)).
60. See Letter from David O'Connor, Assistant to the Commissioner, to Archie Parnell
(Oct. 11, 1979) (on file with Yale Law Journal); interview with David O'Connor, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Jan. 7, 1980).
61. Id. The increase in the number of appearances by the Commissioner was dramatic.
Between 1971 and 1974, Commissioners Thrower, Walters, and Alexander made a total of
25 congressional appearances. Between 1975 and 1978, Commissioners Alexander and Kurtz
made a total of 65 appearances, an increase of 160%.
62. See Operation Leprechaun: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., ist Sess. (1975).
63. See SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, FINAL REPORT ON INQUIRY INTO PRO-
FESSIONAL SPORTS, H. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-107 (1977).
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to IRS difficulties in collecting federal taxes in bankruptcy cases. 04 The
Ninety-fifth Congress proved equally curious about tax administration,
with hearings that ranged from a review of the IRS's audit program of
large corporations65 to scrutiny of an IRS proposal to reorganize its
smaller district offices. 66
Moreover, Congress accompanied this increasing scrutiny of tax law
administration with legislative efforts to prohibit the IRS from execut-
ing certain aspects of the tax law. These prohibitions differ widely;
some simply substitute earlier IRS rules for IRS execution in place of
subsequent Service rules, whereas others freeze the administration of the
tax laws without providing any clear standards at all.
An example of legislative intervention that temporarily substituted
prior IRS rules is the provision in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) that vitiated proposed regulations con-
cerning the tax treatment of salary reduction plans.67 Revenue rulings
issued in 1956, 1963, and 1968 essentially provided that the amount
contributed by an employer under a qualified salary reduction plan
would not be includable in the employee's income until distributed to
the employee. 68 In 1972, regulations were proposed that would have
equated the tax treatment of such contributions with those made by
employees to a qualified retirement plan. 69 The ERISA provision pro-
hibited the IRS from issuing final regulations with respect to salary
64. See The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 789
(1975) (statement of Commissioner Alexander).
65. See Internal Revenue Service Coordinated Examination Program: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977).
66. See Proposed Reorganization of 12 Smallest IRS Districts: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Administration of the Internal Revenue Code of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978). Congressional review of the IRS during this period
was supplemented by the report of a special consultant to the Administrative Conference
of the United States concerning IRS administrative procedures, see REPORT ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), and various General Ac-
counting Office probes into the IRS, see, e.g., Offshore Tax Havens: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
382 (1979) (statement of GAO associate director Richard Fogel).
67. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2006(b), 88 Stat. 829 (1974). A salary reduction plan is an
agreement between an employee and an employer whereby the employee accepts a salary
reduction in return for contributions by the employer to a qualified retirement plan in
the amount of the salary reduction. If the employee contributed directly to the plan, the
contribution would generally be made out of after-tax income.
68. Rev. Rul. 56-497, 1956-2 C.B. 284; Rev. Rul. 63-180, 1963-2 C.B. 189; Rev. Rul.
68-89, 1968-1 C.B. 402.
69. 37 Fed. Reg. 25,938 (1972).
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reduction plans until 1977, and provided that the earlier revenue rul-
ings were to apply in the interim.70
Similarly, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress delayed Revenue
Ruling 76-21571 for one year7 2 in order to give oil companies operating
under existing production-sharing contracts a reasonable time to re-
negotiate their contracts with foreign governments.73 Another provision
of the Act prohibited the IRS from following Revenue Ruling 76-231
until 1979,74 thus substituting earlier IRS rules.75 The ruling required
that tips made by way of charge accounts to an employee must be re-
ported to the IRS by the employer.7 6 The earlier practice was not to
require such reporting.77
Congress continued its newly discovered legislative technique of sub-
stituting prior IRS interpretations of the Code in the Tax Treatment
Extension Act of 1977. The IRS was instructed to disregard Revenue
70. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2006(c), 88
Stat. 829 (1974). The action was extended by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1506, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), and the Tax Treatment Extension Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 5, 92 Stat. 3097 (1978). The issue of tax treatment of salary
reduction plans was finally resolved by Congress in the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2785, (codified at I.R.C. §§ 401(k), 402(a)(18)).
71. 1976-1 C.B. 194 (providing that oil contractor under oil production-sharing con-
tract in Indonesia would not be entitled to foreign tax credit for payments made by
government-owned company to Indonesian government).
72. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1035(c), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). The
provision was expanded in order to treat calendar year and fiscal year taxpayers equally
in the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 701(u)(9), 92 Stat. 2916 (1978).
73. See STAFF OF JOINT CONIN. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG. 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE TAX REFORra Acr OF 1976 (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 263
(Vol. 2) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL EXPLANATION, with page references to 1976-3 C.B.].
74. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2111, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
75. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 73, at 630.
76. Rev. Rul. 76-231, 1976-1 C.B. 379.
77. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 501, 92 Stat. 2763 (I.R.C. §§ 6001,
6041(d)).
A third provision of the Act prohibited the IRS from following Revenue Ruling 73-395,
1973-2 C.B. 87, which held that prepublication costs attributable to textbooks and visual
aids do not constitute research and experimental expenditures deductible under section
174, but that such costs must be capitalized and then depreciated. Under the Act, pub-
lishers were allowed to continue their customary tax accounting methods concerning pre-
publication expenditures "until the IRS issues new, prospective regulations." CONFERENCE
REPORT ON THE TAX REFORMi AcT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 502 (1976),
reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 906 (vol. 3). The House Report that accompanied the bill in-
dicated that the Ways and Means Committee understood "that historically tax accounting
practices in the publishing industry have varied greatly and no standard procedures have
been developed. Industry members apparently have followed their own interpretations,
particularly with regard to the treatment of publishers' publication expenditures." H.R.
REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 337 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2897, 3233-34. The effect of the provision is to allow all publishers to construe the
tax laws as they deem appropriate, so long as consistent with past practice, without regard
to the IRS's position. As a result, the provision essentially substitutes IRS prior practice
concerning prepublication expenses.
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Ruling 76-45378 in determining the deductibility of travel expenses, to
follow IRS rules in effect prior to that ruling,79 and to issue no rulings
or regulations prior to May 1978 with respect to the deductibility of
travel expenses.80 Similarly, in the Revenue Act of 1978,81 CongTess
prohibited the IRS from following proposed regulations concerning
the taxability of employees with respect to employer contributions to
private deferred nonqualified compensation plans.8 2 It provided that
the issue addressed in the proposed regulations be answered with refer-
ence to rulings, regulations, and judicial decisions in effect prior to the
issuance of the proposed regulations.8 3
Whatever the wisdom of this legislative technique, it does at least
substitute prior standards that are sufficiently clear to allow the IRS
to execute the tax law in the affected areas with a fair degree of uni-
formity. Other legislative devices have not had this virtue. In the Tax
Treatment Extension Act of 1977, s4 Congress prohibited the IRS from
issuing any regulations, revenue rulings, or other form of nationwide
guidance prior to July 1978 with respect to the taxation of fringe bene-
fits. 5 The prohibition later was extended until June 1981.86 The fringe
78. 1976-2 C.B. 86 (providing that expenses incurred in traveling between taxpayer's
residence and place of work, even temporary work place, may not be deducted).
79. Prior to its 1976 ruling, the IRS had stated that construction workers could deduct
travel expenses between the area in which they ordinarily lived and worked and a tem-
porary work place outside that area. Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-2 C.B. 303.
80. Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 2, 92 Stat. 3097 (1978).
Congress later extended these instructions until January, 1980, Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-427, § 2, 92 Stat. 996 (1978), and then continued them until June, 1981, Act of
Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 2, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979) (uncodified).
81. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
82. Prop. Treas. Regs. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638 (1978). The proposed regulations
construed the constructive-receipt doctrine to require the inclusion in an employee's gross
income of contributions to the nonqualified plan by the employer in the year the con-
tributions were made. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (taxpayer may not exclude from gross
income any income that taxpayer has right to receive, even if not actually received, if right
is not subject to substantial restrictions).
83. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978). But see H.
REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7046, 7097 (provision not intended to restrict judicial interpretation of law concern-
ing proper tax treatment of deferred compensation).
84. Pub. L. No. 95-615, 92 Stat. 3097 (1978).
85. Id. § 3. This prohibition was in response to activity that began in 1975 when a
discussion draft of proposed regulations was issued concerning the taxation of fringe
benefits under Section 61. 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975). A series of revenue rulings dealing
with the taxation of fringe benefits were drawn up, but Treasury Secretary William Simon
announced that those rulings would not be issued and on December 28, 1976, the discussion
draft of proposed regulations was formally withdrawn. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,334 (1976). At the
time of the congressional action in 1978, however, there were hints that the IRS was about
to issue new guidelines. See STAFF OF THE HousE WAYS AND MEANS TASK FORCE ON EM-
PLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS, 96TH CONG., 1sT. SESS., DISCUSSION AND REPORT ON EMPLOYEE
FRINGE BENEFITS 2 (Comm. Print 1979).
86. Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979). Congress had
1372
IRS Enforcement
benefit prohibition is a restriction on the IRS without any substitution
of a prior rule, and it leaves a void in both the IRS's and the public's
understanding of the proper tax treatment for these benefits. Section
61 of the Code demands that all income be included in gross income,
regardless of source or form, unless excluded by law.87 Courts con-
sistently have held that section 61 "is broad enough to include in tax-
able income any economic or financial benefit ... whatever the form
or mode by which it is effected."' 8 By forbidding the IRS to issue any
nationwide guidance with respect to certain questions that inevitably
arise from the administration of such a broad statutory command,
Congress effectively stopped the administration of the tax law with
respect to fringe benefits.8 9
The Revenue Act of 1978 included a similar provision that pro-
hibited the IRS from issuing any nationwide guidance prior to
January 1980 concerning the classification of employees and inde-
pendent contractors for federal tax purposes. 90 The provision also
provided that workers could be treated as independent contractors in
the interim if there was a "reasonable basis" for doing so, and defined
what this "reasonable basis" must be."' Congress has extended the pro-
earlier extended the prohibition to January, 1980, in Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996 (1978). Although the language of the statutory prohibitions concerns
only regulations, Congress intended to prohibit all forms of nationwide guidance. See note
108 infra.
87. It might be argued that the IRS has had a long-standing practice not to tax certain
fringe benefits, and that this practice has gained the force of law. See O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90
(1920) (employee reimbursement for supper, when paid in connection with voluntary
overtime work, is not includable in gross income); O.D. 946, 4 C.B. 110 (1921) (railroad
passes issued to railroad employees do not constitute income). IRS revenue agents, how-
ever, traditionally have raised the fringe benefit issue during audits of individual tax
returns. See Tax Treatment of Employee Fringe Benefits: Hearings Before a Task Force
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 12 (1978) (statement of
Commissioner Kurtz) (fringe benefit practices have come under closer scrutiny since advent
of special employment tax enforcement program in 1972). The IRS has not changed its
long-standing practice, but has undertaken a more effective enforcement strategy.
88. Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945); see Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434
U.S. 77 (1977); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
89. See pp. 1377-80 infra.
90. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885 (1978).
Important consequences flow from this classification. If a worker is classified as an
employee, the employer must withhold income taxes and the employee's portion of Social
Security taxes from the employee's wages. I.R.C. §§ 3102, 3402. The employer also must
pay the federal unemployment tax and the employer's portion of Social Security taxes
with respect to the employee. I.R.C. §§ 3111, 3301. If a worker is classified as an inde-
pendent contractor, however, no employee/employer relationship exists and the employer
need not withhold or pay federal unemployment taxes and Social Security taxes for the
worker.
91. The provision defined "reasonable basis" as reliance on judicial precedent or
earlier IRS pronouncements, on the fact that a prior IRS audit did not result in tax
assessments with respect to the classification of employees, or on the long-standing practice
of a significant segment of an industry.
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vision, thus effectively amending the underlying statutes until 1981.02
In addition to these legislative prohibitions, CongTess recently has
limited the IRS use of appropriated funds to carry out certain as-
pects of the tax law.9 3 Last year, Congress provided that none of the
fiscal year 1980 funds appropriated for the IRS could be used to
formulate or implement any nationwide guidelines that would cause
the loss of the tax-exempt status of private secular or private religious
schools, unless the guidelines were in effect prior to August 22, 1978.4
This limitation was Congress's reaction to the IRS's release on that
date of a proposed revenue procedure that set forth new guidelines to
determine whether the operations of a private school were racially
discriminatory, thus making the school ineligible for tax-exempt
status.95 Congress also provided that no fiscal year 1980 funds could
be used by the IRS to carry out any revenue ruling that provided that
a taxpayer is not entitled to the charitable contribution deduction for
contributions that are used for educational purposes by a religious
school.96 This appropriations limitation was intended to prohibit the
IRS from enforcing Revenue Ruling 79-99, 97 which provided that tax-
payers are not entitled to charitable contribution deductions for pay-
ments to a private tax-exempt religious school unless they exceed the
fair market value of the education provided to the taxpayer's child.9
From Congress's standpoint, the important distinction between ap-
propriations limitations and legislative prohibitions on the IRS is that
of committee jurisdiction.9 9 From the IRS's perspective, however, there
92. Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 9(d), 93 Stat. 1275, 1278 (1979).
93. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-74, §§ 103, 614, 615, 93 Stat. 559, 562, 576-77 (1979).
94. Id. §§ 103, 615.
95. The IRS issued a revised version of the revenue procedure on February 9, 1979.
Both the original and revised version of the proposed revenue procedure are reprinted in
Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means (part 1), 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 21, 41 (1979).
96. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-74, § 614, 93 Stat. 576 (1979).
97. 1979-1 C.B. 108.
98. See pp. 1381-82 infra (discussing provision).
99. The appropriations committees of the House and Senate have jurisdiction over
appropriations limitations, whereas the tax-writing committees of Congress have juris-
diction over legislative prohibitions concerning the IRS. Both the House and Senate Rules
fortify the jurisdiction of the two house's respective appropriations committees by for-
bidding appropriations in bills reported by legislative committees. House Rule XXI cl.
5, H.R. Doc. 403, supra note 37, at 541; Senate Rule XLI, S. Doe. 1, supra note 41, at 68.
Conversely, both the House and Senate Rules provide that it will not be in order to
consider substantive legislation in appropriations bills. House Rule XXI cl. 2; Senate
Rule XVI, cls. 2 & 4; see Borda, Legislative Aspects of Appropriation Bills-The Point of
Order, Its Use and Effects, 32 GEo. L.J. 395, 400 (1944) (congressional rules against legisla-
tive propositions on general appropriations bills).
These rules are not always followed, however, and the courts have often been called
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is little if any practical difference between an appropriations limitation
that restricts the use of funds to carry out guidelines issued after a
certain date and a legislative prohibition that forbids the issuance
of new guidelines after a certain date.100 Both types of restrictions pre-
vent the IRS from following its current interpretations of the Code.
Both create similar administrative problems, and both raise similar
constitutional questions.
B. Prudential and Constitutional Considerations
As discussed above, the effect of some recent congressional prohibi-
tions has been the substitution of prior IRS rules for subsequent IRS
interpretations of the Code, or, in some cases, an effective freeze of the
administration of the tax law. The two types of prohibition raise quite
different constitutional and practical issues. When Congress substitutes
fairly definite earlier IRS rulings, the IRS is left with clear standards
for enforcement and thus may minimize problems of nonuniform ap-
plication of the tax laws. Congressional substitution of prior IRS rules
for proposed new interpretations of the Code may be a useful method
by which Congress can indicate that the IRS's proposed changes deviate
from what Congress intended the tax laws to be, an action that doubt-
less is constitutionally appropriate. At the same time, such legislative
substitutions may be criticized on prudential grounds as undermining
public confidence in the fairness of the tax laws. The IRS often pro-
poses new interpretations of the Code in response to apparent incon-
sistencies and inequities in the treatment of similarly situated tax-
payers, and congressional reversion to prior rules perpetuates these
upon to determine the legal effect of various provisions embodied in appropriations acts.
See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-91 (1978); United States v.
Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555-61 (1940). In no case has a court refused to give substantive
legal effect to a provision in an appropriations act solely on the basis of House and
Senate Rules. But see Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 136 (1st Cir. 1979) (Bownes,
J., dissenting) (congressional rules of procedure expressly prohibit changing existing
law via appropriations acts, and "compel a finding that there was no substantive
amendment" of statute under consideration). Although amendments by implication via
appropriations acts "are not favored," Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497,
503 (1936), courts need not find explicit congressional intent to amend existing law if there
is a "positive repugnancy" between the two statutes that leaves them irreconcilable.
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (quoting United States v. Borden
Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939)); see Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968).
100. Unlike the legislative prohibition concerning fringe benefits, however, the appro-
priations limitations may have amended by implication the relevant underlying sections
of the Code. See pp. 1382-83 infra. In either case, unless there exist fairly definite rules
prior to a certain date, the IRS is placed in the troublesome position of being required to
execute portions of the tax law without definite guidance and without the opportunity
to formulate new rules.
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apparent difficulties. Nevertheless, this decision ultimately must rest
with Congress, which is directly accountable to the public.
Prudential considerations become critical, however, when the effect
of the congressional prohibition is to prevent the administration of
the tax law altogether. When Congress prohibited the IRS from issuing
nationwide guidance concerning fringe benefits, for example,' 0 ' it
provided no basis for IRS action whatsoever. In the words of Com-
missioner Jerome Kurtz, the prohibition has caused "severe problems
for tax administration. Existing inconsistencies continue and expand.
Uncertainties and apparent inequities in the treatment of different
benefits undermine the voluntary compliance system."'10 2
Congressional actions that freeze the administration of the tax laws
deserve strong criticism both from a tax policy perspective and on
practical grounds. With regard to tax policy, such a freeze promotes the
nonuniform treatment of similarly situated taxpayers and thus threat-
ens the orderly administration of the tax laws. Similarly, the appropria-
tions limitation that prevents the IRS from spending funds to deny
tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools appears likely to
reinforce the public's cynicism about lawmaking and government. 10 3
In practice, the results of a freeze can be ludicrous. When Congress
postpones the effective date of revenue rulings by tacking on riders to
an appropriations act, the result may be hidden from those who are most
concerned. Taxpayers who read the Code, regulations, and even per-
tinent judicial decisions will not be aware of such one-year changes in
the tax law. Must tax practitioners now review appropriations acts to
determine the content of current tax law? Should the IRS revise its
instructions for taxpayers on such a basis? Moreover, appropriation acts
are valid for only one year, and a fiscal year at that. Do changes in the
law apply only for the last quarter of one calendar tax year and for the
next three quarters of the next calendar tax year? At the end of the
fiscal year, does the former substantive law again come into effect? It
is not clear what should happen to tax deficiencies pending before the
pertinent fiscal year; presumably, prior law would continue to apply.
Appropriation act amendments to the Code are simply without justi-
fication in terms of prudent tax policy and interfere with the orderly
and consistent administration of the tax law.
101. See pp. 1372-73 suPra.
102. Tax Treatment of Employee Fringe Benefits: Hearings Before a Task Force of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978) (statement of Com-
missioner Kurtz).
103. Professor B. Wolfman, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, August 31, 1979,
§ A, at 22, col. 3.
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Just as important as any prudential issues, however, are the constitu-
tional problems that Congress raises when it decides "not to face sub-
stantive issues in various areas, but simply to stop administration."' 04
Such actions may violate the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment and contravene the separation of powers doctrine. "The
tax system fails when Congress has neither provided legislative answers
nor permitted the IRS to provide national guidance as to the ad-
ministration of existing law."' 0 5 In some cases, this failure may be of
constitutional significance.
1. Violation of Separation of Powers Doctrine
The contours of the separation of powers doctrine are vague, and it
is probably impossible to determine the precise point at which con-
gressional activity violates the doctrine. It is not even clear which plain-
tiffs would possess standing to litigate such questions.106 As a con-
ceptual matter, however, there are at least two ways in which con-
gressional prohibitions on the IRS arguably violate the separation of
powers doctrine.
The first occurs when Congress halts or changes the administration
of the tax law without amending, even by implication, the underlying
statute on which the administration is based. The IRS, like any execu-
tive agency, is charged with seeing that the laws "be faithfully exe-
cuted."' 07 Some congressional prohibitions make this impossible. For
example, when Congress restricted the IRS from issuing nationwide
guidance with respect to the treatment of fringe benefits, 08 its failure
to amend section 61 left the underlying law exactly as it had been.
Commissioner Kurtz, commenting on the administrative nightmare
thus created, explained the IRS's difficulty: "As an administrator, I
104. Address by Commissioner Kurtz, A.B.A. Section on Taxation Annual Meeting,
August 11, 1979; see Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Tax Report G-5 (Aug. 17, 1979)
(quoting portions of address).
105. Hearings on Miscellaneous Tax Bills II: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Taxa-
tion and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 78
(1979) (statement of Donald Lubick, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy of the Treasury
Department).
106. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-89 (1923) (neither state nor
taxpayer possesses standing to challenge federal spending statute). It may be possible, how-
ever, for the IRS, the Treasury Department, and the President to litigate the question.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding senator's
standing to sue executive branch for intrusion into legislative powers).
107. See pp. 1362-65 supra.
108. Although the fringe benefit prohibition applied expressly only to the issuance of
regulations, it was intended to apply to the issuance of revenue rulings and revenue
procedures as well. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2508, 2510.
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can administer a law that says an item is exempt, but I can't administer
a law which says, 'Don't tell anybody,' but that is essentially where we
are on fringe benefits."'10 9 When Congress enacts a provision that so
substantially restricts the IRS that a particular provision of the Code
cannot be enforced effectively, Congress unconstitutionally intrudes
into the domain of the executive branch.1 0
There is some judicial support for this conclusion. "Legislative
power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make
laws, but not to enforce them," as the Supreme Court noted in
Springer v. Philippine Islands."' There are important limits on con-
gressional authority to interfere with agency administration of the
law. One parallel may be drawn to cases holding that congressional
pressure may not be permitted to change agency decisions made under
operating statutes. 11 2 Another parallel exists to cases holding that con-
gressional pressure may not interfere with an administrative agency's
adjudicative functions 13 or violate the due process rights of parties to
an administrative proceeding." 4 A third parallel may be drawn to
agency prosecutorial discretion"15 and to the rule that Congress may
109. Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means (part 2), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 896 (1979)
(statement of Commissioner Kurtz).
110. It could be asserted that the President did not perceive any unconstitutional in-
terference because he did not veto the enactment. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,
383 F.2d 166, 182-83 (2d Cir. 1967) (President's failure to veto statute, said to violate
separation of powers, weighs strongly in favor of its validity). The President may have
chosen not to raise the issue for political reasons, however.
111. 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139 (1976).
112. E.g., D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972) (overturning agency decision to approve construction of
bridge on statutory grounds, because decision had been improperly influenced by con-
gressman's threat to block appropriations for unrelated project); United States ex tel.
Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (House subcommittee did not violate
separation of powers doctrine by influencing change in immigration policy, but relief
granted because agency did not give notice and allow public comments concerning rule
change). Although Congress theoretically could remove any statutory prohibitions on con-
gressional interference in agency action, that might "only succeed in forcing courts to
explicitly constitutional grounds in order to disapprove improper influence in the ad-
ministrative decisionmaking process." Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Ad-
ministrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1369, 1437 (1977).
113. E.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588, 610 (3rd Cir. 1977) ("courts must not
tolerate undue legislative interference with an administrative agency's adjudicative func-
tions").
114. E.g., Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966) (invalidating FTC
divestiture order on basis of congressional hearings conducted while case was pending
before agency, and finding that to "subject an administrator to a searching examination
as to how and why he reached his decision in a case still pending before him, and to
criticize him" violated due process rights of party to agency proceeding).
115. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("Executive Branch has
exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case"); Moog




not terminate a pending agency investigation or order courts or
agencies to decide a particular case in a particular way." 6 It is for the
courts, not Congress, to say when an existing law has been misinter-
preted."17 If the power to execute the laws means anything, it is that
neither Congress nor individual congressmen may interfere with the
executive decisions of administrative agencies as to how they interpret
laws already in force. If certain fringe benefits are not covered by
section 61, courts may reverse the IRS's interpretation. If fringe bene-
fits were never intended to come under section 61, Congress may amend
the law. But Congress may not instruct the IRS not to enforce exist-
ing law any more than it can withdraw jurisdiction from a court in
order to decide the outcome of a pending case.'"'
It does not greatly help Congress's position to note that the IRS can
still enforce section 61 with respect to fringe benefits on a case-by-case
basis, 119 or that Congress suspended national policymaking by the IRS
in order to provide itself sufficient time to study this complex issue.120
Congress clearly recognized that the use of fringe benefits has been
increasing over the years121 and that fringe benefits may fall under
section 61.122 Although these facts demand an institutional response
from the IRS, Congress has effectively barred enforcement of current
law without attempting to resolve the substantive issues involved.12 3
116. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871) (act passed after plaintiff won
judgment in Court of Claims that directed court to dismiss suit by any unpardoned rebel
for want of jurisdiction was unconstitutional encroachment on judicial power to weigh
and give proper effect to evidence, and thus "passed the limit which separates the legisla-
tive from the judicial power"); id. at 147-48 (Congress may not pass laws that impair
President's pardoning power); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (bill of
attainder clause prevents Congress from prohibiting former rebels to become members
of certain professions).
117. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (it "is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192-93 (1881) (reversing contempt citation on ground that matter
under inquiry was "in its nature clearly judicial" and therefore "confided by the Con-
stitution to the judicial and not to the legislative department of the government.")
118. See note 116 supra (citing cases).
119. See note 87 supra.
120. See H.R. RPe. No. 1232, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. News 2508, 2510 ("a proper review" of fringe benefit issues "requires a
longer period of time").
121. H.R. REP. No. 1232, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2508, 2510.
122. Id. at 4 (citing Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945), for rule that Sec-
tion 61 is broad enough to include "any economic or financial benefit" conferred as com-
pensation "whatever the form or mode by which it is effected").
123. See Pine, Panel Decides to Block Tax on Benefits, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1979, § C,
at 1, col. 3. Congressman Collins has introduced a bill that if enacted would permanently
forbid the IRS from issuing regulations with respect to the taxation of fringe benefits.
H.R. 5165, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), 125 CONG. REc. H7364 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979).
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If a taxpayer requests a private letter ruling concerning the taxability
of a particular fringe benefit, the IRS cannot give that taxpayer an
answer. If a revenue agent requests technical advice concerning the
taxability of a particular fringe benefit, the IRS cannot give that
revenue agent an answer. To permit enforcement in such circumstances
only on a case-by-case basis, according to individual revenue agents'
interpretations of the law, is effectively to halt the formulation and
implementation of general IRS policy approaches in the form of
revenue rulings and instructions to the field. Because the "power of
an administrative agency . . . necessarily requires the formulation of
policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or ex-
plicitly, by Congress,"'124 it follows that when Congress restricts the
IRS from exercising this "necessary power" it unconstitutionally inter-
feres with the executive branch. 12 5
Congressional restrictions on the IRS also may violate the separation
of powers doctrine when they clash with prior judicial commands that
the IRS execute the law in a certain manner. Because it is the province
of the courts, not Congress, to interpret what an existing law means,
Congress may not oppose such a judicial interpretation or deny the
IRS the funds necessary to execute the law in accordance with judicial
interpretation 126 unless Congress explicitly alters the law itself. Other-
wise, the same law may have as many different meanings as there are
sessions of Congress.
One example of such a clash is Congress's interference with IRS
efforts to provide nationwide guidance with respect to the revocation
of the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools.'
27
In 1971, the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction against the IRS in
Green v. Connally128 ordering that tax-exempt status not be given to
such schools, that tax-exempt status previously accorded to such schools
124. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
125. See note 108 supra (Congress prohibited not only promulgation of regulations
concerning taxability of fringe benefits, but all other forms of nationwide guidance such
as revenue rulings and procedures as well).
126. Cf. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 92-93 (1979) (extending unemployment bene-
fits rather than overturning whole program as unconstitutional, despite greater cost of
remedy); Clark v. Board of Educ., 374 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1967) (courts cannot accept
"the position that the flow of federal money is the final arbiter of constitutionally pro-
tected rights"). But cf. Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws-
Should Legislators Supervise Administrators? 41 CALIF. L. Rav. 565, 568 (1953) (Congress
may slash appropriations for enforcement of certain laws without violating separation of
powers).
127. See p. 1374 suPra. See generally Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial
Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REv. 378 (1979).
128. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub. nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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be revoked, and that tax deductions for contributions to such schools
be disallowed. 20 The Court's decision was based on a statutory in-
terpretation of the Code.130 In these circumstances, as Professor
Laurence Tribe noted in testimony before the House Ways and Means
Oversight Subcommittee, "to intrude the legislative branch into the
Federal district court proceedings would raise the most profound
questions of the separation of power in our Constitution.'u31 Neverthe-
less, the Ashbrook Amendment'3" to the fiscal year 1980 appropriations
act provided that none of the funds made available for the IRS could
be used to implement rules to cause the revocation of tax-exempt status
for such schools.133
Similarly, the Doman Amendment 3 4 to the fiscal year 1980 appro-
priations act prohibited the IRS from using any of its funds to enforce
Revenue Ruling 79-99.l3' As discussed above, this ruling provided
that taxpayers are not entitled to charitable contribution deductions
for payments to a private tax-exempt religious school unless the con-
tributions exceed the fair market value of the education provided to
the taxpayer's child.' 30 The ruling was no radical interpretation of the
129. 330 F. Supp. at 1179-80.
130. Id. at 1164-65.
131. See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 366 (1979) (state-
ment of Professor Laurence Tribe).
132. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-74, § 103, 93 Stat. 562 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ashbrook Amendment].
133. Id. Specifically, Congress provided that none of the funds made available to the
IRS
shall be used to formulate or carry out any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, regula-
tion, standard, or measure which would cause the loss of tax-exempt status to private,
religious, or church-operated schools under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 unless in effect prior to August 22, 1978.
Although the court's injunction in Green concerned only private schools in Mississippi,
the prohibition embodied in the Ashbrook Amendment does not allow the IRS to spend
funds even in Mississippi with respect to post-August 22, 1978, revenue rulings concerning
private schools. Moreover, the Green court stated that the "underlying principle is broader,
and is applicable to schools outside Mississippi with the same or similar badge of doubt."
330 F. Supp. at 1174. The guidelines in effect prior to August 22, 1978, are not sufficient
to satisfy the court's injunction. See note 152 infra.
134. Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-74, § 614, 93 Stat. 576 (1979) [hereinafter cited a& Dornan Amendment]. The
amendment prohibits the IRS from using any funds to
carry out any revenue ruling of the Internal Revenue Service which rules that a tax-
payer is not entitled to a charitable deduction for general purpose contributions which
are used for educational purposes by a religious organization which is an exempt
organization as described in section 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
135. 1979-1 C.B. 108; see 125 CONG. REC. H5975-76 (daily ed. July 16, 1979) (remarks of
Congressman Dornan) (introducing amendment prohibiting use of funds to enforce
Revenue Ruling 79-99).
136. See p. 1374 supra.
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Code, it should be noted, but simply a restatement of firmly established
principles concerning the deductibility of charitable contributions. In-
deed, the ruling was based on the facts and holding of Oppewal v.
Commissioner,"37 and it is not clear why the IRS thought a revenue
ruling was necessary at all. In any event, like the Ashbrook Amend-
ment, the Dornan Amendment denies the IRS the funds to carry out
the interpretation of a section of the Code in a way that a federal court
has held is required under that section. Commissioner Kurtz has
acknowledged the awkward position in which the IRS is now placed,
stating that the IRS is at a loss as to "how not to administer a revenue
ruling that simply restates a court decision.' 38
In analyzing the separation of powers concerns here, the first ques-
tion must be whether the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments defy the
courts by prohibiting the IRS from carrying out their instructions and
interpretations, or whether the spending limitations implicitly amend
the underlying statutes on which the courts' interpretations rest. The
latter would not violate the separation of powers doctrine, because Con-
gress clearly has the power to change the law. There are serious ob-
jections to such an interpretation, however. First, it is a violation of
Congress's own rules to enact substantive legislation in an appropria-
tions act. 1 9 Second, the constitutionality of such amendments by
implication is itself subject to doubt on grounds of vagueness. Nothing
in the Code itself now repeals Oppewal or Green or the sections on
which they rest. The Dornan Amendment of the appropriations act
obviates a revenue ruling that merely restates a standard interpretation
of the Code without explicitly amending that section. Congress could
amend the relevant sections explicitly without violating the separation
of powers doctrine, but the prohibition of funds for executive enforce-
ment of certain sections of the Code implies only that a particular
Congress disagrees with the way in which courts have interpreted such
sections. Congress should not be allowed to effect implicit amendments
of the Code by prohibiting funds for enforcement when the result
clashes with judicial interpretation of what those sections require. Such
congressional prohibitions raise separation of powers issues that, al-
though not easily answered, should not be lightly dismissed.
It seems likely, however, that the IRS must conclude that the Dornan
and Ashbrook amendments do amend the Code, if only by implica-
137. 468 F.2d 1000 (Ist Cir. 1972).
138. Address by Commissioner Kurtz, suPra note 104.
139. See note 99 supra.
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tion, 140 and that such amendments by implication are probably valid.141
The next question then must be whether the amendments clash with
interpretations in Oppewal and Green that are based on the Constitu-
tion. If so, the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments would apparently
violate the separation of powers doctrine by contravening a judicial
interpretation of the Constitution. Although the Green court focused
on statutory interpretation, 142 its clear and uncompromising language
as to the probable unconstitutionality of a contrary statutory inter-
pretation 143 makes it reasonable to conclude that the court's decision
was based in part on constitutional grounds. Oppewal makes no men-
tion of the Constitution at all, but a contrary statutory interpretation
in that case might raise constitutional problems that are discussed
below. No clearer violation of the separation of powers doctrine can
be imagined than a situation in which Congress ignores the constitu-
tional interpretations of the federal judiciary.
2. Other Constitutional Violations
Congressional prohibitions on the IRS that effectively stop the ad-
ministration of the tax law may be unconstitutional for reasons aside
from the violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The Doman
and Ashbrook amendments in particular may be unconstitutional
violations of the establishment clause' 44 or the equal protection com-
ponent of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 45
140. Senator Chiles, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee responsible
for the IRS budget, complained during the Senate debate on the Ashbrook and Dornan
amendments that the amendments were legislative in effect:
There is a Committee on Finance that is supposed to have jurisdiction over the In-
ternal Revenue Service. . . .But suddenly, we have been here [two] days now, and
. .. we have not been arguing appropriations. . . . I do not know how we have
gotten into this situation where legislation is continually attached to the appro-
priations bill.
125 CoNG. REC. S11,983 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979) (remarks of Senator Chiles); see 125
CONG. REc. H5880-85 (daily ed. July 13, 1979) (remarks of numerous congressmen, all
assuming legislative effects of amendments). Given the apparent irreconcilability of the
Code and the amendments and the fact that a number of congressmen intended to amend
the Code, it is difficult to imagine how the IRS could conclude that the Dornan and
Ashbrook amendments did not amend the Code by implication.
141. The courts have often been asked to determine the legal effect of provisions em-
bodied in appropriations acts. See note 99 sukra (discussing cases).
142. See p. 1381 supra.
143. See 330 F. Supp. at 1164-65 ("a contrary interpretation of the tax laws would raise
serious constitutional questions" because "it would be difficult indeed to establish" that
tax exemptions and deductions could be given to schools practicing racial discrimination
"consistently with the Constitution").
144. U.S. CONSr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion").
145. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
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The first question here is whether the tax-exempt status accorded
private schools by virtue of section 501(c)(3) or the deductibility of
contributions to such schools permitted by section 170(c)(2) so involve
the federal government as to constitute federal action. 146 If so, the
IRS is constitutionally obligated to revoke the tax-exempt status of
racially discriminatory private schools and to deny the deductibility of
contributions to religious schools in cases that violate the establish-
ment clause. If the IRS is thus obligated, then Congress violates the
Constitution in passing legislation that prohibits the IRS from using
any of its funds to comply with constitutional mandates.
Although no court has determined whether section 501(c)(3) and
section 170(c)(2) involve the government to such an extent as to con-
stitute federal action, that would appear to be the case. A three-judge
court in McGlotten v. Connally 47 determined that the federal govern-
ment's allowance of charitable contribution deductions under section
170(c)(4) and the allowance of tax-exempt status under section 501
(c)(8) to fraternal orders that excluded nonwhites from membership
did constitute "federal action."'148 Such tax benefits amount to tax
subsidies, the court said, and when granted to racially discriminatory
fraternal orders those subsidies violate both the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.149 By virtue
without due process of law"). The Fifth Amendment's due process clause has been held
to encompass the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits
state discrimination on the basis of race, color, or religion. See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
146. It is clear that the federal government could not provide these benefits directly.
In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), a case involving state rather than federal
aid, the Supreme Court held:
if the [private] school engages in discriminatory practices, the State by tangible aid
in the form of textbooks thereby gives support to such discrimination. Racial dis.
crimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution and "[i]t is also
axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to ac-
complish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish."
Id. at 464-65 (quoting Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475-76 (M.D.
Ala. 1967)). See generally Note, supra note 127, at 396-400.
Plaintiffs in the Green case have reopened the suit, alleging that-the IRS is not com-
plying with the court's permanent injunction and order. In Green v. Miller, (D.D.C.
1980), [1980] Fa. TAxEs (P-H) 80-650, the court denied plaintiffs' and defendants' mo-
tions for summary judgment, but supplemented the injunction in order to establish pro.
cedures and standards for reviewing compliance with the previous court order.
147. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
148. Id. at 459.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976). The McGlotten court also held that social clubs, though
racially discriminatory, were entitled to tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(7). 338 F.
Supp. at 458. Congress thereafter added Section 501(i) in order to deny tax-exempt status
to social clubs that discriminate "against any person on the basis of race, color, or
religion," Pub. L. No. 94-568, § 2(a), 90 Stat. 2697 (1976), even though Congress acknowl-
edged that this rule was already implied in Section 501(c)(3). See S. REP. No. 1318, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 & n.5 (1976).
It is generally agreed that many income tax provisions operate as a form of "govern-
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of such tax treatment, "the Government has become sufficiently en-
twined with private parties to call forth a duty to ensure compliance
with the Fifth Amendment."'150
This reasoning applies with equal force to the allowance of chari-
table contributions deductions under section 170(c)(2) to private
schools that practice racial discrimination and to the tax-exempt status
granted to such schools under section 501(c)(3). The IRS is constitu-
tionally obligated to forbid deduction of contributions to racially dis-
criminatory schools and to deny such schools a tax-exempt status.'
The guidelines in effect prior to August 22, 1978, are simply not
sufficient to satisfy the constitutional duty placed on the IRS,152 and
the Ashbrook Amendment thus effectively prohibits the IRS from
carrying out its constitutional duty. This places the constitutionality
of the Ashbrook Amendment in grave doubt; appropriations acts have
been held just as unconstitutional as substantive legislation. 53 If the
Ashbrook Amendment is held unconstitutional under the Fifth Amend-
ment, that defect should be cured by Congress allowing an adequate
ment spending for . .. favored activities of groups through the tax system rather than
through direct grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance." Surrey & McDaniel,
The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C.L.
R v. 225, 228 (1979). Such provisions are commonly referred to as tax expenditures, and
are different from those structural provisions required for the implementation of a
normal income tax. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974), requires the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office to report tax expenditures listed in the Presidential budget to the Committee on
the Budget in each House. 2 U.S.C. § 601, 602(f)(1) (1976).
150. 338 F. Supp. at 456. The court reasoned that the allowance of the charitable
contribution deductions involved the federal government to a greater degree than the
allowance of other deductions, in part because of "the aura of Government approval
inherent in an exempt ruling by the Internal Revenue Service .... " Id. at 457.
151. See id. at 459 (tax-exempt status granted fraternal organizations under Section
501(c)(8) deemed sufficient government involvement to invoke Fifth Amendment). But cf.
Williams v. Howard University, 528 F.2d 658, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (university's tax-exempt
status and receipt of federal funds does not show sufficient government control to make
its readmission decisions equivalent to federal action).
152. See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means (part 1), 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-8
(1979) (statement of Commissioner Kurtz). Specifically, under pre-August 22, 1978, guide-
lines, a private school needs only to profess a nondiscrimination policy even though it
actually practices racial discrimination. As a result, some schools that have been ad-
judicated to be racially discriminatory have nonetheless retained their tax-exempt status.
Id.
153. Appropriations acts have been held as effective as ordinary bills in enacting
legislation, see, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1, 9 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974), and like substantive legislation, such acts can violate con-
stitutional mandates, see, e.g., Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir.
1936); cf. Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Iowa 1975) (legislature may not "under
the guise of a qualification upon an appropriation" violate state constitution). Without
such a doctrine, the flow of federal money would be the final arbiter of constitutionally
protected rights. Clark v. Board of Educ., 374 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1967).
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appropriation to support the IRS's compliance with the Constitution.1 4
Similarly, a special provision to make educational fees for attending
private religious schools deductible might violate the establishment
clause of the First Amendment. 155 By restricting the IRS's enforcement
of section 170(c)(2) in a way that advantages private religious schools,
the Dornan Amendment might be held to be an unconstitutional form
of aid to such schools.
Finally, it is at least arguable that congressional prohibitions that
inevitably lead to the unequal treatment of similarly situated tax-
payers also violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment.156 By preventing the IRS from formulating nationwide guide-
lines for the treatment of fringe benefits, but leaving the IRS free to
enforce section 61 as it affects fringe benefits on a case-by-case basis,
Congress has virtually guaranteed there will be different treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers. When Congress thus interferes with the
administration of the tax laws, it may violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment even if it does not also violate
the separation of powers doctrine.
III. Improvement of the Relationship Between Congress and the IRS
The recent tendency of Congress to review and restrict the IRS's
administration of the tax laws raises a number of difficult constitu-
tional and practical issues. Congressional disregard for the administra-
tive difficulties caused by these restrictions and the impact of these
restrictions on the public's perception of the fairness of the tax laws
suggests that the relationship between Congress and the IRS is at a low
ebb. Continuing the current relationship may impair the efficient and
equitable operation of the tax system and undermine the morale of
154. Given the length of time necessary for a judicial determination and the fact that
an appropriations act is in force for only one year, it is likely that the issue will be moot
by the time a court could address the constitutionality of the Ashbrook Amendment. Even
so, a court might accept jurisdiction under the theory of Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814,
816 (1969), that a "continuing controversy" would exist unless the court acted. See
Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911) (first articulating "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" formula); Civil Liberties Alert, October, 1979 (ACLU
newsletter) (predicting annual amendments making similar restrictions).
155. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (holding unconstitutional certain
aspects of state program aiding predominantly church-related schools); National Coalition
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (deny-
ing summary judgment on claim of unconstitutional federal aid to religious schools made
by original plaintiffs in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
156. See State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931) (tax laws do not
violate equal protection if the "classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests
upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy"); McCarthy v. Jones, 449 F.
Supp. 480 (S.D. Ala. 1978) (holding state tax statute unconstitutional because it provided
for assessment of taxes on property in same class at different rates in different counties).
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those who administer it. There are, however, steps that can be taken
to improve the relationship between Congress and the IRS.
A. Resolving the Constitutional Problems
A number of possible approaches to the constitutional issues raised
by recent congressional activity deserve discussion, even if only to show
that these approaches are all ultimately unsatisfactory and thus that
the constitutional issues may never be resolved. First, the IRS could
attempt to litigate the separation of powers issue directly. Although
such a case would be one of first impression, there exists some authority
for the proposition that the IRS could litigate such a claim against
Congress. 15 7 Such an approach would force judicial resolution of Con-
gress's efforts to restrict the operation of the IRS.
Second, the IRS could narrowly interpret congressional restrictions
or ignore them completely. For instance, because the fringe benefits
restriction only expressly prohibits the IRS from promulgating "regula-
tions in the final form,"'' 58 the agency could achieve its constitutional
duty to execute a nationwide policy by employing means other than
regulations, including oral or less formal written instructions. Indeed,
the IRS may be under a constitutional duty to interpret all statutes
so that they come within constitutional limits when the agency has
doubts as to their validity.Y59 Even if such an action provoked a legal
challenge, the ensuing court action might benefit the IRS. Once sued,
the IRS could assert the constitutional claims discussed above, and the
courts too would share the duty to construe statutes so as to avoid
constitutional challenges addressed to them. 00
157. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dictum that
executive branch may appropriately invoke separation of powers doctrine when it per-
ceives unconstitutional intrusion by legislative branch); Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d
Cir. 1980) (executive branch officers may sue superior officers to free themselves from
directives that arguably impose unconstitutional limits on their powers); cf. Note, Judicial
Resolution of Inter-Agency Legal Disputes, 89 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1980) (arguing that
agencies have capacity to sue in order to vindicate institutional interests in effective
regulation).
158. Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, § 3, 92 Stat. 3097
(1978). But see note 108 supra (although provision only applied expressly to regulations,
Congress intended it to cover all forms of nationwide guidance including revenue rulings
and revenue procedures).
159. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 171-72
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969) (quoting with approval Commissioner's
opinion that FCC should not use regulatory process to require self-censorship contrary
to First Amendment); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (agency must formulate
procedures that conform to due process requirements). Such a duty is also implied in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1976), which empowers courts to set
aside agency decisions "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity."
160. See, e.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 66 (1979) (on motion to file bill of
complaint); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978). This rule of construction also
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Similarly, the IRS could seek the opinion of the Attorney General
as to the constitutionality of various congressional prohibitions.' 0 '
Assuming the Attorney General rendered an opinion that a particular
restriction was unconstitutional, the Commissioner could then decide
whether to ignore the restriction on that basis, or whether to use the
Attorney General's opinion as the foundation for a supplementary
budget request for enforcement funds. Merely requesting an Attorney
General's opinion might put Congress on notice of the questionable
constitutionality of its earlier practice, thus making Congress more
likely to grant the supplementary budget request or repeal the prohibi-
tion.
The difficulty with all of these approaches is that they might
further alienate or provoke Congress with regard to the IRS. Some
congressmen might construe a lawsuit by the IRS as a direct attack on
the legislative power of Congress,' 02 and any refusal to interpret
restrictions as Congress intended or to obey appropriations restrictions
might mean a major confrontation between the IRS and Congress that
could only bring further difficulties for the agency. The recent con-
gressional restrictions on the IRS may ultimately be tested in the
courts, but it may be expecting too much of an administrative agency
to ask that it take on the politically hazardous task of provoking such a
lawsuit directly.
In short, there may be no acceptable way for the IRS to test the
constitutionality of a congressional restriction in the courts. Moreover,
given the subtle nature of the separation of powers issues raised by
some of these recent restrictions, there is no way to predict whether the
courts would find such restrictions unconstitutional. At the same time,
the novel kinds of congressional statutes considered here raise enormous
practical and administrative difficulties even if they are not clearly
unconstitutional. In view of the separation of powers policies and the
enforcement problems, it does not seem too much to ask that Congress
applies to statutes delegating authority to administrative bodies. E.g., National Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 396, 341-42 (1974); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62 (1932). But see United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 693-94 (1948) (Court will not
attempt to avoid constitutional question by construing statute contrary to express mean-
ing given to it by Congress).
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 512 (1976) (permitting head of apy executive department to require
opinion of Attorney General). Under this provision, the IRS would have to request that
the Secretary of the Treasury seek the opinion. See I Op. Atty. Gen. 211 (1818) (sub-
ordinate officers to seek opinions through departmental heads).
162. Wilbur Mills, former Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, has
suggested that any such lawsuit would ultimately harm the relationship between Congress
and the IRS even if the agency were successful, because of the probable animosity such a
lawsuit would engender. Interview with Wilbur Mills, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 1979).
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revert to its more traditional forms of lawmaking and agency review.
From this perspective, constitutional objections are only a symptom of
the underlying problem, which is the quality of the relationship be-
tween Congress and the IRS.
B. Avoiding the Need for Constitutional Resolution
There are a number of ways in which Congress and the IRS might
act in order to make a resolution of possible constitutional problems
unnecessary. This means reducing Congress's perceived need for statutes
that freeze tax administration or cut off funds for enforcement, thus
reducing the likelihood that Congress will continue to adopt such
statutes.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that congressional action
to acquire greater direct control over the IRS is not likely to lead to a
long-term lessening of tensions. 1 3 Congress could, for instance, in-
stitute a legislative veto,0 4 requiring the IRS to submit proposed rules
and regulations to Congress for its approval. 1 Even aside from the
constitutional problems such a scheme might raise,10 however, it is not
clear that Congress is equipped to handle the massive detail of the tax
system10 7 or that such a scheme would improve the administration of
the tax laws.'0 8 Alternatively, Congress could grant the President
163. Cf. H. REP. No. 1232, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Nrws 2508, 2514-15 (additional views of Rep. Ketchum on H.R. 12841)
(arguing that executive agencies including IRS require more effective control by Congress).
164. For discussion of such proposals, see Abourezk, supra note 14, at 323-25; Bruff &
Gellhorn, supra note 112, at 1370-71; Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-
A Reexamination, 46 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 351 (1978).
165. See, e.g., H.R. 495, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). Under these schemes, the congres-
sional reviewing entity usually has a fixed period of time in which to veto the proposed
agency rule, which becomes effective if not disapproved. A number of statutes now con-
tain legislative veto provisions. E.g., Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380,
§ 509(a), 88 Stat. 567 (1974).
166. Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions
and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569, 593-97 (1953) (legislative veto usurps executive
function to implement and enforce laws, and bypasses presidential veto power); Stewart,
Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 593 (1976); Watson, Congress
Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983
(1975). The one case that has expressly addressed the issue upheld the constitutionality
of a one-house veto, although it emphasized "several special factors" and did not consider
"the general question of whether a one-House veto is valid as an abstract proposition, in
all instances." Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1059 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1009 (1978).
167. See Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Man-
agement of Tax Detail, 34 LAw & CoNTaMP. PROB. 673 (1969).
168. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 112, at 1437-39 (legislative veto scheme
would adversely affect certainty of IRS rules); id. at 1439 (Congress should abandon
legislative Neto as device for oversight of agency rulemaking); Watson, supra note 166, at
988 (legislative veto scheme would cause general shift in focus of governmental power and
operations of government system).
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statutory oversight power'0 9 with particular exercises of that power
subject to congressional veto.170 Such a change would probably serve
only to increase agency vulnerability to executive and congressional
pressures,' 7 however, without greatly enhancing congressional con-
fidence in the IRS. 72
Similarly, congressional doubts as to the wisdom of IRS policies
might be allayed if Congress expanded judicial review of IRS inter-
pretations of the tax laws, but this approach too is unlikely to lead to
significant progress. Congress could eliminate judicial deference to the
legality of an agency's rules and regulations. Under this change, the
IRS might be made to bear the burden of persuading courts that a
proposed rule is correct instead of the current practice that requires
a challenger to persuade the court of the rule's illegality. 173 Such a
proposal seems indefensible, however, because it misapprehends the
nature of current judicial "deference,"' 7 4 ignores instances in which
agencies must choose between several equally satisfactory alternatives
in making one definite rule,173 and also seems unlikely to improve
169. See, e.g., Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J.
1395 (1975) (proposing grant of statutory power to President to consider, modify, or
reverse any agency policies, rules, or regulations); 65 A.B.A.J. 1284 (1979) (ABA House of
Delegates endorsed this proposal during 1979 annual meeting).
170. See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 169, at 1415 (Congress would have 60 days to
veto executive orders implementing proposed presidential action concerning agency rule
or policy under review).
171. See McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLuM. L.
Rav. 1119, 1172 (1977) (agencies under this scheme "will have tremendously increased in-
centives to bow to executive and congressional pressures"); p. 1365 supra (potential
for improper congressional influence concerning agency action).
172. The proposal to increase presidential statutory power has also been criticized as
being "legally questionable and politically dangerous," see Note, Delegation and Regula-
tory Reform: Letting the President Change the Rule5, 89 YALE L.J. 561, 573-78 (1980), and
for making the White House a super administrative agency and "simply putting in
another layer of bureaucrats to make government more complicated," 65 A.B.A.J. 1284
(1979) (summary of remarks of opponents to proposal eventually endorsed by House of
Delegates). Any presidential reversal of the IRS for nontax reasons would also impair
congressional confidence in the IRS as an impartial enforcement agency.
173. For an example of this approach, see the bills to accomplish this change in-
troduced by Senator Bumpers over the last five years. S. 111, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. S410 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1979); S. 86, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. S125
(daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977); S. 2408, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CoNG. REc. 29942 (1975). See
generally 125 CONG. REC. S12,146 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers)
(legislative change would increase judicial control over executive agency action).
174. Courts already "establish principled boundaries to agency discretion by reference
to the type of decision under review and the nature of the agency's statutory authority."
McGowan, supra note 171, at 1166; see p. 1365 sut/ra.
175. Interview with Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in Washington,
D.C. (Nov. 6, 1979) (when several equally acceptable alternatives exist, agency may not be
able to meet burden of persuading court of any one rule's correctness).
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congressional confidence in the IRS.1 6 Proposals to expand taxpayer
standing to challenge "lenient tax rules"' 77 seem more desirable from
an administrative point of view, 78 although such proposals would also
increase the burdens on the judiciary 179 without necessarily improving
the relationship between Congress and the IRS. Moreover, the con-
gressional restrictions discussed in this Article have been responses to
perceptions that IRS policies were too harsh, not that they were too
lenient. 8 0
If congressional controls of the IRS-either directly, or through the
President or the courts-are unlikely to ease tensions between the two
bodies, then what steps might be successful? Several possibilities appear
promising. Even in the absence of legislative changes, the IRS can
reduce congressional perception of the need to increase control over the
administration of the tax laws. First, if the IRS is to persuade Congress
of the need to avoid constitutionally suspect and administratively
troublesome restrictions, it must communicate more effectively with
the legislative branch. The agency should continue to inform appro-
priate congressmen of significant modifications in its practices or in-
terpretations of the tax law,' 8 ' but it should expand its efforts in order
to explain vigorously why certain congressional practices create vast
administrative difficulties.'8 2 In doing so, the agency must be wary of
176. See McGowan, supra note 171, at 1164 (proposal makes administrative agencies
mere agents of courts charged only with making factual determinations and presenting
possible interpretations of law); id. at 1168 (proposal would remove self-imposed restraints
on judiciary, thereby involving them in political issues).
177. See, e.g., Asimow, Standing to Challenge Lenient Tax Rules: A Statutory Solution,
57 TAxs 483, 491-92 (1979) (proposing statute that would grant taxpayer standing to
challenge lenient tax rules); Tannenbaum, Public Interest Tax Litigation Challenging
Substantive IRS Decisions, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 373 (1974) (current standing law does not
permit potential litigants to challenge lenient tax rules).
178. The IRS is as likely to misinterpret tax law when making favorable interpretations
as when making unfavorable ones, and such proposals would permit taxpayers to challenge
IRS misinterpretations that are now beyond the review of any court. See note 177 supra.
Reliance problems under this scheme could be avoided by permitting courts to revoke
improperly lenient IRS rules only prospectively, and an absolute right of intervention
could be provided for anyone asserting an interest in maintaining the challenged rule in
order to guard against a less than wholehearted defense of lenient rules by the IRS. See
Asimow, supra note 177, at 502-03.
179. See Thrower, Public Interest Litigation to Affect Substantive Decisions, 27 NAT'L
Txx J. 389, 392 (1974) (proposal "could be seriously disruptive of orderly administration").
180. See pp. 1370-74 supra.
181. Interview with Donald Alexander, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 1979); interview with Mortimer Caplin, former Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1979); interview with Sheldon Cohen,
former Commissioner of Internal Reenue, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 6, 1979); interview
with Jerome Kurtz, supra note 175.
182. See Kefauver, Executive Congressional Liaison, in CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 41,
43 (W. Travis ed. 1967) (area that most urgently needs improvement between executive and
legislative branches is flow of information).
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exposing itself to improper congressional influence,8 3 or contradicting
positions taken by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy and thus confusing various tax issues and congressional under-
standing of administration policy. 84 Nevertheless, a more effective
communication of IRS concerns to Congress seems crucitl to a solution
of its administrative problems.
Second, the IRS could begin to construct a public record of all con-
gressional contacts concerning its interpretations of the tax law. Con-
gressional hearings and the comments of individual congressmen in
response to a notice of proposed IRS rulemaking are already a matter
of public record, of course,8 3 but this is not true of other, less formal
contacts.' 86 A public record of these contacts would heighten con-
gressional awareness of the fact that ultimately it is the agency's
responsibility to interpret and executg the Code.
On the other hand, Congress too could dramatically improve its
relationship with the IRS and thus avoid the need for any constitu-
tionally questionable restrictions on the agency. First, it could instruct
the parliamentarians of the House and Senate to adopt a more realistic
test for determining whether an appropriations act is legislative in
effect, thus ensuring the ability to follow congressional rules that
substantive legislation cannot be considered in appropriations bills.'8 7
When the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments were proposed, con-
sideration of the amendments was allowed because they took the form
of limitations on spending,188 despite the fact that several congressmen
declared them to be legislative. 89 The parliamentarians should adopt
183. See p. 1367 supra (possibility of improper congressional request for assistance
with regard to constituent tax problems).
184. Interview with Rep. Al Ullman, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1979).
185. Treas. Reg. § 601.702(d)(9) (1980). courts have suggested that executive agencies
must compile a public record of all third party contacts with agency officials who may
reasonably be expected to be involved in agency rulemaking after the issuance of formal
notice of rulemaking, and of such contacts made prior to the formal notice of rulemaking
that ultimately form the basis of agency action. E.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). It should be noted that I.R.C.
§ 6103 prohibits publications of a constituent's name if a congressman refers a matter to
the IRS.
186. Even though revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and the Internal Revenue
Manual are at times functionally equivalent to Treasury regulations, they are generally
adopted without notice of rulemaking or provision for public comment. See Asimow,
Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75
MicH. L. REv. 521, 525 (1977); Comment, Revenue Rulings and the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 1975 Wis. L. RFv. 1135.
187. See note 99 supra.
188. Interview with William Holmes Brown, Parliamentarian of the United States
House of Representatives, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1979).
189. See note 140 supra.
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the test developed by the courts, which considers whether an appro-
priations act provision is irreconcilable with underlying statutory
provisions. 90 The judicially derived effects test would restore mean-
ing to the House and Senate rules that prohibit substantive legisla-
tion in appropriations bills, thus making statutes such as the Ashbrook
and Dornan amendments less likely in the future.
Second, the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee should consider amending their rules to require
administrability findings in reports that accompany tax bills.' 91 Such a
requirement would increase congressional sensitivity to the impact of
its actions on the administration of the tax law and thus encourage
increased attempts to avoid administrative problems. 92 Had Congress
realized the difficulties that would be caused by the prohibition on
fringe benefit guidance by the IRS, for example, it seems less likely that
Congress would have passed the prohibition without amending the
underlying law.
Third, Congress should attempt to coordinate its oversight activities
of the IRS more effectively. Changes in House or Senate rules do not
seem necessary, 193 because congressional rules already require the co-
ordination of oversight committees. 94 There is room for enormous
improvement in this effort, however. 95 Congress might also consider
reorganization of its committee and subcommittee structure as it relates
190. See note 99 supra.
191. Senate Rule XXIX cl. 5, S. Doc. 1, supra note 41, at 55-56, requires each report
that accompanies a bill to include an evaluation of the regulatory impact of the bill,
including the number of individuals and businesses affected and the amount of addi-
tional paperwork reasonably anticipated. House Rule XI cl. 2(l)(3)(A), H.R. Doc. No.
403, supra note 37, at 406, requires each report that accompanies a bill to include over-
sight findings with respect to the bill's subject matter. These rules could be broadly
construed so as to require administrability findings with respect to certain provisions, al-
though both rules are now narrowly applied. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 1656, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1978) (recommending enactment of black-lung benefits trust provision on basis of
oversight findings).
192. Such a requirement might also contribute to the simplification of the tax law.
Given the amount of business of the tax-writing committees of Congress, it might be
advisable to limit the number of provisions that require an administrability finding by
certifying such provisions through consultation among the oversight subcommittees, the
IRS, and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
193. Indeed, some changes could be imagined that would only aggravate the problem.
Congressional rules might limit the number of times per session that executive branch
officials could be requested to appear before Congress, but this might lead to an im-
practical rush at the beginning of each Congress that might be worse than the current
system.
194. See note 40 supra (duties of oversight subcommittees to coordinate review of IRS
activities).
195. See p. 1366 supra. By monitoring the number of appearances made by IRS
officials, the oversight subcommittees might persuade other committees to resist request-
ing excessive or unnecessary appearances.
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to IRS activities, because the current fragmentation of responsibility
and duplication of effort among several bodies in the same house are
barriers to the development of coherent tax policy and increase the
likelihood that Congress may act unwisely.
In the end, these simple efforts seem likely to improve the relation-
ship between Congress and the IRS and thus avoid the need to resolve
the constitutional problems raised by recent congressional restrictions
on the IRS. It is clear, however, that some improvement is imperative.
Congress has prohibited the IRS from administering certain aspects of
the tax law, disregarding the difficulties thereby created for the IRS
and the impact of those prohibitions on the public's perception of the
fairness of the tax system. These prohibitions create administrative
difficulties, but they also suggest serious constitutional problems that
are caused when Congress interferes with an executive agency's duty
to execute the laws faithfully. Unless the relationship between Con-
gress and the IRS improves in a way that eliminates congressional
perceptions of the need for such statutes, these constitutional issues
must eventually be resolved in a judicial arena that holds only hazards
for both of the principal actors in our tax system.
1394
Vol. 89: 1360, 1980
The Yale Law Journal



















































Dwight C. Smith III
Richard S. Soble
Jeffrey W. Stempel









Secretaries to the Editors Edna I. Scott, Pamela Willmott
Student Contributors to This Issue
Simon Friedman, Contractual Interactions and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code
David E. Van Zandt, Neutralizing the Regulatory Burden: The Use
of Equity Securities by Foreign Corporate Acquirers
1395
